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We examine the expectational stability (E-stability) of the rational expectations 
equilibrium (REE) in a simple New Keynesian model in which private agents 
engage in adaptive learning by referring to the central bank's forecast. In this 
environment, to satisfy the E-stability condition, the central bank must respond 
more strongly to the expected inflation rate than the so-called Taylor principle 
suggests. On the other hand, the central bank's strong reaction to the expected 
inflation rate raises the possibility of indeterminacy of the REE. In considering 
these problems, a robust policy is to respond to the current inflation rate to a 
certain degree. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the development of adaptive learning in macroeconomics (Evans and Honkapo-
hja [2001]), many studies have investigated the expectational stability (E-stability)
conditions of the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in various macroeconomic
models. One of the important applications to monetary economics is Bullard and
Mitra [2002]. They examine the E-stability condition in a simple class of the New
Keynesian model, which consists of an IS equation, a New Keynesian Phillips curve
(NKPC), and a Taylor-type monetary policy rule.1 Their results indicate that the
so-called Taylor principle, which requires the central bank to adjust the nominal
interest rate by more than one-for-one with the inﬂation rate, corresponds to the E-
stability condition under some versions of Taylor-type monetary policy rules, includ-
ing a forward-looking rule that incorporates the expectations for the future inﬂation
rate and output gap, which are assumed to be homogeneous between the central bank
and private agents.2
Honkapohja and Mitra [2005] extend the analysis of Bullard and Mitra [2002] to
introduce heterogeneous expectations between the central bank and private agents.
They show that, even if the central bank and private agents initially have diﬀerent
expectations, the correspondence between the E-stability condition and the Taylor
principle holds, as long as the learning algorithms used by these two agents are
asymptotically identical. However, they further show that, if the diﬀerence of learning
algorithms remains even in the long run, the Taylor principle does not generally
correspond to the E-stability condition. Therefore, their analysis points out that
the heterogeneity between the central bank and private agents is a key issue for
determining the E-stability condition in a simple New Keynesian model.
However, we should note that the environments of these previous studies are still
quite simple because the studies assume that the central bank and private agents
independently (or simultaneously) engage in adaptive learning. In other words, the
previous studies assume that there is no interaction in the learning process of the
central bank and private agents. Of course, as Honkapohja and Mitra [2005] noted,
this assumption is introduced as a natural benchmark.3 However, the validity of
this assumption is empirically arguable whenw et a k ea c c o u n to fp o s s i b l ei n t e r a c t i o n s
between the central bank and private agents. In this respect, Fujiwara [2005] provides
empirical evidence that, in Japan’s survey data, the central bank’s forecast inﬂuences
the forecast of private agents (not vice versa). Therefore, his results indicate that
1Evans and Honkapohja [2003a] review the studies of adaptive learning in New Keynesian models.
2The issue of stability under learning when the central bank introduces an interest-rate rule is
originally raised by Howitt [1992] in an IS-LM model with a New Classical Phillips curve.
3Honkapohja and Mitra [2005] stated that, “We will focus on the situation in which both the
private sector and the central bank use their own forecasts in their decision-making and the forecasts
are not available to the other agents. Consequently, the forecasts have no strategic role. This case
can be seen as a natural benchmark.”
1the central bank is the leader and private agents are the followers of expectation
formations.4
In this study, we examine the E-stability of the REE in a simple New Keynesian
model in which the central bank is the leader and private agents are the followers of
expectation formations. This means that private agents engage in adaptive learning
by referring to the central bank’s forecast.5 This kind of leader-follower relationship
of adaptive learning has already been introduced by Granato, Guse, and Wong [2007]
in the traditional “cobweb” model. However, their analysis investigates the heteroge-
neous expectations among private agents. In contrast, the distinctive feature of our
study is that it investigates the heterogeneous expectations between the policymaker
(namely, the central bank) and private agents.
Since we assume that private agents refer to the central bank’s forecast, our
study introduces the heterogeneity concerning the perceived law of motion (PLM)
used by the central bank and private agents. However, as for the learning algorithm,
we assume that both the central bank and private agents use the recursive least
squares (RLS) with decreasing gain, which is the most standard algorithm in the
literature.6 In these respects, the environment of our study contrasts sharply with
that of Honkapohja and Mitra [2005], which assumes that the PLMs are homogeneous
and that the learning algorithms are heterogeneous.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our simple
version of the New Keynesian model. We show that, if the central bank and private
agents are independently learning, the E-stability condition corresponds to the Taylor
principle, as reported by Bullard and Mitra [2002]. In Section 3, we examine the E-
stability condition when private agents engage in adaptive learning by referring to
the central bank’s forecast. In Section 4, we investigate the relationship between the
E-stability and the determinacy (uniqueness) of the REE. In Section 5, we examine
the E-stability in the reverse situation in which the central bank engages in adaptive
learning by referring to the forecast of private agents. In Section 6, we conclude our
analysis.
4Fujiwara [2005] suggests, “In the learning context, it would be better to suppose that the central
bank is a leader rather than a follower when analyzing monetary policy in Japan, since the results
in this paper indicate that professional forecasters tend to learn from the central bank rather than
to inﬂuence it (p. 261).”
5In this study, we restrict our attention to a Taylor-type simple monetary policy rule. Thus, we
do not examine the E-stability under optimal monetary policy. The property of optimal monetary
policy in the presence of adaptive learning is examined in Evans and Honkapohja [2003b, 2006].
6An alternative algorithm is RLS with constant gain, which is typically used to describe a situation
in which agents take account of the possibility of structural changes (as is explained by Evans and
Honkapohja [2001]). Honkapohja and Mitra [2005] introduce heterogeneous constant gains between
the central bank and private agents. They show that, if the diﬀerence of constant gains remains in
the long run, then it matters for the E-stability condition.
22 Framework
2.1 Model
We use a simple version of the New Keynesian model. Our model is simpler than
that of Bullard and Mitra [2002] or Honkapohja and Mitra [2005], since we introduce
a static version of the IS equation, in which the current output gap does not depend
on the expectation for the future output gap. We choose this formulation because
(i) we can analytically derive the E-stability condition and (ii) we can numerically
obtain essentially the same results in an extended model which introduces a dynamic
version of the IS equation.7 Therefore, we consider that the current version of our
model is useful to investigate the essence of our problem.
T h es t a t i cI Se q u a t i o na n dt h eN K P Ca r eg i v e na sf o l l o w s :




t πt+1 + κxt, (2)
where xt is the output gap, πt is the inﬂation rate, rt is the nominal interest rate, and
rn
t is the natural rate of real interest. Each variable is deﬁned as the deviation from
its steady state.8 In particular, rt is the deviation of the nominal interest rate from
its steady-state level, which is consistent with zero inﬂation and steady-state output
growth. EP
t denotes private agents’ subjective (possibly nonrational) expectation. σ,
β,a n dκ are the structural parameters which satisfy σ > 0, 1 ≥ β > 0,a n dκ > 0.
The process of natural rate of real interest is given by
rn
t = ρrn
t−1 + εt, (3)
where ρ satisﬁes 1 > ρ > 0 and εt follows i.i.d. with zero mean.
The central bank introduces a forward-looking monetary policy rule:
rt = φECB
t πt+1, (4)
7By using the model of Bullard and Mitra [2002], which introduces a dynamic version of the IS
equation, we numerically obtain the result that the Taylor principle is not a suﬃcient condition for
the E-stability of the REE if private agents engage in by referring to the central bank’s forecast,
which is the main ﬁnding of this study.
8Preston [2006] examines the E-stability of the REE in a New Keynesian model, in which private
agents make current decisions about spending and pricing based on the long-horizon forecasts. He
shows that the Taylor principle is not a suﬃcient condition for the E-stability under a forward-
looking version of the Taylor rule. This result diﬀers from Bullard and Mitra [2002]. However,
Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra [2003] show that the approaches of Preston [2006] and Bullard and
Mitra [2002] are not inconsistent, because if the law of iterated expectations at an individual and
aggregate levels holds, then the IS equation and the NKPC with long-horizon forecasts correspond to
those with one-period-ahead forecasts. Since this study assumes that the law of iterated expectations
at an individual and aggregate levels holds, we introduce the NKPC with a one-period-ahead forecast.
3where φ is the responsiveness to the expected inﬂation rate. ECB
t denotes the central
bank’s subjective expectation. In this study, we investigate mainly the situation in
which the central bank and private agents have heterogeneous expectations (at least
in the short run). Therefore, the central bank’s expectations (ECB
t ) and private
agents’ expectations (EP
t )a r ep o t e n t i a l l yd i ﬀerent.
The model can be reduced to the model of inﬂation dynamics:
πt = A + BEP
t πt+1 + CECB
t πt+1 + Drn
t , (5)
where A =0 ,B= κσ + β,C= −κσφ, and D = κσ.
2.2 E-stability When the Central Bank and Private Agents Are In-
dependently Learning
Next, we present the E-stability condition of the REE when the central bank and
private agents independently engage in adaptive learning. Following Bullard and
Mitra [2002], we introduce a simplifying assumption that the central bank and private
agents have an identical PLM such as
πt = e a +e brn
t , (6)
where e a ande b are coeﬃcients, which are updated in every period. Since the functional
form of (6) corresponds to the minimal state variables (MSV) solution of the system
(5), we call the learning process of (6) “MSV learning.”9
Based on PLM, the one-period-ahead expectation is calculated as follows:
ECB
t πt+1 = EP
t πt+1 = e a + ρe brn
t . (7)
By substituting (7) into (5), we derive the actual law of motion (ALM) as follows:
πt = A +( B + C)e a +( ρ(B + C)e b + D)rn
t . (8)
From (6) and (8), the mapping functions (T-maps) from PLM to ALM are as follows:
Ta(e a)=A +( B + C)e a, (9)
Tb(e b)=ρ(B + C)e b + D. (10)
The REE with the MSV form (MSV solution) is obtained as the ﬁxed point of
T-maps. The parameters of the MSV solution (a and b) are computed as follows:
a =( 1− (B + C))−1A, b =( 1− ρ(B + C))−1D.
9See McCallum [1983] for the details of MSV solution.
4Note that the combination of a and b is unique. It means that, if we restrict at-
tention to the MSV form, the solution is unique, regardless of the values of structural
parameters. For the moment (except for Section 4), we focus on the MSV solution.
Next, we derive the E-stability condition of the REE. In this study, we assume
that both the central bank and private agents use RLS with decreasing gain. Then,
the E-stability of the REE is deﬁned as the local asymptotic stability of the ordinary








= Ta(e b) −e b =( ρ(B + C) − 1)e b + D, (12)
where τ is “notional” or “artiﬁcial” time.
From these ODEs, the E-stability condition is derived as two inequalities:
Dha(e a)=B + C − 1 < 0, (13)
Dhb(e b)=ρ(B + C) − 1 < 0. (14)
Since 1 > ρ > 0, (14) holds if (13) holds. Therefore, the necessary and suﬃcient





Since β is usually very close to unity (such as 0.99), (15) indicates that the E-
stability corresponds to the Taylor principle, which requires the central bank to adjust
the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one with the inﬂation rate. This is
one of the main ﬁndings of Bullard and Mitra [2002].
3 E-stability When Private Agents Are Learning from
the Central Bank’s Forecast
In this section, we examine the E-stability condition when private agents engage in
adaptive learning by referring to the central bank’s forecast. It means that the central
bank is the leader and private agents are the followers of expectation formations.
3.1 PLM and ALM
As in the previous section, we assume that the central bank engages in MSV learning.
Then, the central bank’s PLM is the same as in the previous section:
πt = e a +e brn
t . (16)
5At the beginning of period t, the central bank updates the parameters of e a and e b
by using the data of period t−1 (yt−1 and rn
t−1). Then, the central bank observes the
realization of the natural rate of real interest at period t (rn
t ). By using the newest
estimates of e a and e b, the central bank calculates the forward-looking expectations as
follows:
ECB
t πt+1 = e a + ρe brn
t . (17)
After calculating (17), the central bank announces this forecast to private agents.
The expectation formation of private agents is the core part of this analysis. In
this respect, we assume that private agents can observe the central bank’s forecast
ECB
t πt+1 when they form the expectation EP
t πt+1. However, we also assume that
private agents do not know how the central bank calculates the forecast ECB
t πt+1.
Namely, private agents do not know the model used by the central bank. This
is a usual assumption of adaptive learning, in which agents do not use structural
knowledge to form their expectations.
We assume that private agents determine how to utilize the central bank’s forecast
in forming their expectations by evaluating the historical performance of the central
bank’s forecast. Speciﬁcally, we assume that private agents estimate the following
PLM:
πt = e c + e dECB
t−1πt. (18)
By estimating (18) with RLS, private agents assess the historical performance
of the central bank’s forecast.10 If the forecast has historically performed well, the
constant term e c approximates zero, and the slope e d should be close to unity. In
contrast, if the central bank’s forecast has performed poorly, e c approximates the
sample average of πt,a n de d should be close to zero.11
Private agents update the parameters of e c and e d by using the data of period
t − 1 (πt−1 and ECB
t−2πt−1). Since private agents are the followers, they can use the
central bank’s forecast ECB
t πt+1 in forming their expectations at period t (EP
t πt+1).
To calculate EP
t πt+1, private agents use their evaluation of the performance of the
central bank’s forecast as follows:
EP
t πt+1 = e c + e dECB
t πt+1. (19)
(19) indicates that the forecast of private agents is inﬂuenced by the central bank’s
forecast. In addition, the inﬂuence of the central bank’s forecast on the forecast of
10As is seen in the next subsection, the use of RLS in estimating (18) is consistent with the REE.
11This means that private agents do not automatically follow the central bank’s forecast (if such is
the case, the coeﬃcients are ﬁxed as e c =0and e d =1 , which corresponds to the case of homogeneous
learning). This is a natural assumption, because private agents do not have any reason to follow
the central bank’s forecast if the historical performance of central bank forecast is very poor. The
empirical analysis of Fujiwara [2005] supports this idea, because his results show that private agents
do not perfectly equalize their forecast as the central bank’s forecast even after observing the forecast.
6private agents is determined by the estimated parameter e d. Therefore, (19) illustrates
a situation in which private agents refer to the central bank’s forecast, depending on
its historical performance.
By inserting both agents’ expectations ((17) and (19)) into the system of (5), we
derive ALM for πt as follows:
πt = A + B(e c + e de a)+Ce a +( ρ(Be d + Ce )b + D)rn
t . (20)
3.2 Equilibrium
Next, we derive the T-maps from PLM to ALM. From (16) and (20), the T-maps
about parameters of e a and e b are given as follows:
Ta(e a)=A + B(e c + e de a)+Ce a, (21)
Tb(e b)=ρ(Be d + C)e b + D. (22)
Since private agents’ PLM (18) is not the MSV form, we must derive the T-maps
from the relevant orthogonality conditions.12 From (17) and (18), private agents’
“projected” ALM is deﬁned as follows:
πt = Tc + Td(e a + ρe brn
t−1). (23)
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From (20), (24), and (25), we derive the T-maps about e c and e d as follows:
Tc(e c)=A + Be c +( 1− ρ)(Be d + C)e a −e b−1De a, (26)
Td(e d)=ρBe d + ρC +e b−1D. (27)
The equilibrium is derived as the ﬁxed points of the T-maps ((21), (22), (26), and
(27)). The coeﬃcients at the equilibrium are given as follows:
a =( 1− (B + C))−1A,b =( 1− ρ(B + C))−1D,c =0 ,d =1 .
Note that, at the equilibrium, (19) becomes as follows:
EP
t πt+1 = ECB
t πt+1 =( 1− (B + C))−1A + ρ(1 − ρ(B + C))−1Drn
t . (28)
12See Branch [2004] for the derivation of T-maps using orthogonality conditions.
7Therefore, at the equilibrium, expectations become homogeneous between the
central bank and private agents. Furthermore, these expectations are the same as
the expectation at the MSV solution in Section 2. Therefore, the expectation of (28)
is the rational expectation and this equilibrium is the REE. This means that the
economic dynamics at equilibrium are exactly the same in the two cases: (i) the case
in which the central bank and private agents are independently learning and (ii) the
case in which private agents engage in adaptive learning by referring to the central
bank’s forecast. However, in considering the transition dynamics under adaptive
learning, the E-stability conditions of the REE can diﬀer between these two cases.
In the next subsection, we examine this issue.
3.3 E-stability
Next, we examine the E-stability condition. The E-stability of the equilibrium is the
local asymptotic stability of ODEs associated with the T-maps of (21), (22), (26),
and (27). Although these T-maps are interdependent, Tb(e b) and Td(e d) only depend
on e b and e d. Therefore, we can examine the stability of e b and e d, independently of the
stability of e a and e c.
To examine the stability of e b and e d,w ed e ﬁne the ODEs associated with the








Tb(e b) −e b




ρ(Be d + C)e b + D −e b
ρBe d + ρC +e b−1D − e d
!
. (29)
Given the convergence of e b and e d,w ec a ne x a m i n et h es t a b i l i t yo fe a and e c by








Ta(e a) − e a




A + B(e c + e de a)+Ce a − e a
A + Be c +( 1− ρ)(Be d + C)e a −e b−1De a − e c
!
. (30)
We derive the E-stability condition as the necessary and suﬃcient condition for
the ODEs of (29) and (30) to be locally asymptotically stable around the REE. The
result is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the central bank engages in MSV learning and all pri-
vate agents engage in adaptive learning by referring to the central bank’s forecast.









Proof. See Appendix A.
8Proposition 1 leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the central bank engages in MSV learning and all private
agents engage in adaptive learning by referring to the central bank’s forecast. Then,
if κσ > 1 − β, the REE of (5) is E-stable if and only if (31) holds.
Since β is close to unity, κσ > 1 − β holds for a wide range of parameter sets
(κ and σ). Then, the Taylor principle, which is expressed as (32), is not a suﬃcient
condition for the E-stability, because the E-stability condition corresponds to (31).
This means that, to satisfy the E-stability condition, the central bank must adjust
the nominal interest rate by more than double the rise of central bank’s expected
inﬂation rate.
Thus, the E-stability condition in this situation is quite diﬀerent from the condi-
tion in the benchmark case analyzed in Section 2. Although the equilibrium dynamics
of these two cases are exactly the same, the E-stability condition is severer in the
environment of this section. This means that, if private agents engage in adaptive
learning by referring to the central bank’s forecast, the central bank must respond to
the expected inﬂation rate more strongly than the Taylor principle suggests.
3.4 Intuition for the Result
As is shown in the previous subsection, if private agents engage in adaptive learning
by referring to the central bank’s forecast, the central bank has to respond more
strongly to the expected inﬂation rate than the Taylor principle suggests.
T h eb a s i ci n t u i t i o nf o rt h er e s u l ti sg i v e nb yt h ef a c tt h a t ,i nt h es i t u a t i o no f
this section, private agents’ forecast errors, which are deﬁned as the deviations of
private agents’ expectations from rational expectations, are magniﬁed, compared to
the central bank’s forecast errors. The reason is twofold. Firstly, private agents can
make estimation errors concerning the parameters e c and e d, which are introduced in
their PLM (18). These estimation errors are the ﬁrst source of private agents’ forecast
errors. Secondly, as in (19), the central bank’s forecast errors inﬂuence the forecast
of private agents. Since the parameter e d is almost unity around the equilibrium, the
central bank’s forecast errors bring about almost the same amount of forecast errors
as those of private agents. This is the second source of private agents’ forecast errors.
Summing up these two sources, the total forecast errors of private agents exceed the
central bank’s forecast errors.
Since the central bank introduces its own forecast in the monetary policy rule (4),
the central bank responds to its own forecast errors. However, this policy response
is insuﬃcient to oﬀset the forecast errors of private agents. Because private agents
have larger forecast errors than the central bank, the central bank must respond very
strongly to its own forecast, in order to ensure the convergence of economy to the
REE. This is why the E-stability is not attained solely by the Taylor principle.
93.5 E-stability When Part of Private Agents Are Learning from the
Central Bank’s Forecast
So far, we have assumed that all private agents refer to the central bank’s forecast
in adaptive learning. However, this could be regarded as an extreme case.13 In this
subsection, therefore, we consider a more realistic environment in which some private
agents engage in adaptive learning by referring to the central bank’s forecast.
Suppose that a proportion μ of private agents engage in adaptive learning by
referring to the central bank’s forecast (1 ≥ μ ≥ 0). The remaining 1 − μ of private
agents engage in MSV learning. Denote EP1
t πt+1 as the forecast of the former private
agents and EP2
t πt+1 as the forecast of the latter private agents. Note that the forecast
made by the latter is just the same as the central bank’s forecast. Therefore, the
aggregate forecast of private agents (EP
t πt+1) can be expressed as follows:14
EP
t πt+1 = μEP1
t πt+1 +( 1− μ)EP2
t πt+1
= μEP1
t πt+1 +( 1− μ)ECB
t πt+1. (33)
By substituting (33) into (5), we obtain the following ALM:
πt = A + b BEP1
t πt+1 + b CECB
t πt+1 + Drn
t , (34)
where b B = μB and b C =( 1− μ)B + C.
(34) has the same form as (5). Therefore, in order to examine the E-stability of
the REE, we can follow the same steps of the subsections 3.2 and 3.3, by replacing
the matrices of B and C with b B and b C. Then, the result for the E-stability of the
REE is given by the following proposition.15
Proposition 2 Suppose that the central bank and a proportion 1−μ of private agents
engage in MSV learning. In addition, suppose that a proportion μ of private agents
engage in adaptive learning by referring to the central bank’s forecast. Then, the REE
13In this respect, Kohn [2005] judges that private agents do not rely perfectly on the central bank’s
expectation. He remarks that “in the United States, we have some indirect evidence that crowding
out of private views has not increased even as the Federal Reserve has become more talkative. Market
interest rates have continued to respond substantially to surprises in economic data.”
14Guse [2005] incorporates a convex combination of heterogeneous forecasts into a simple macro-
economic model with multiple equilibria. Branch and McGough [2006] present the underlying as-
sumptions for the validity of a convex combination of heterogeneous forecasts. These include (i) the
identical expectations at steady state, (ii) some linearity properties of expectations, and (iii) the
law of iterated expectations at both an individual and aggregate level. We assume that all of these
assumptions are satisﬁed.
15We can easily ﬁnd that the equilibrium of (34) is just the same as the REE of (5).
10of (5) is E-stable if and only if (35) and (36) hold.
φ > 1+μ +







Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Suppose that the central bank and a proportion 1 − μ of private agents
engage in MSV learning. In addition, suppose that a proportion μ of private agents
engage in adaptive learning by referring to the central bank’s forecast. Then, if μ ≥
(κσ + β)−1, the REE of (5) is E-stable if and only if (35) holds. If μ < (κσ + β)−1,
the REE of (5) is E-stable if and only if (36) holds.
Thus, if μ is relatively low, then the Taylor principle is the necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the E-stability.16 However, if μ is relatively high, to ensure the con-
vergence to the REE, the central bank must respond more strongly to the expected
inﬂation rate than the Taylor principle suggests.
4 Determinacy and E-stability
In the previous sections, we have examined the E-stability condition of the REE.
However, in the standard analysis, the condition for determinacy (uniqueness) of the
REE is also regarded as the minimum criterion which should be satisﬁed in monetary
policy rules. In this regard, Bernanke and Woodford [1997] point out that the issue of
determinacy is especially relevant when the central bank introduces a forward-looking
monetary policy rule, such as (4). The reason why the determinacy condition has
not been examined in the previous sections is that we have restricted our attention to
the MSV solution, which is unique in our model. However, if we broaden our scope
to introduce the solution forms other than the MSV form (i.e., sunspot equilibria),
we must examine the condition for determinacy of the REE.17 In particular, we must
investigate the relationship between the determinacy condition and the E-stability
condition. In this section, we examine this issue.
16Note that, for a wide range of parameter sets, the value of (κσ +β)
−1 is between 0 to 1,s i n c eβ
is almost unity.
17Honkapohja and Mitra [2004] examine the existence of learnable sunspot equilibria in a simple
New Keynesian model with a forward-looking Taylor rule. In contrast to our study, they introduce
a benchmark assumption that the central bank and private agents engage in independently adaptive
learning. They show that learnable sunspot equilibria can exist even if the policy rule satisﬁes the
Taylor principle.
114.1 Determinacy of the REE
The determinacy condition is presented by Blanchard and Kahn [1980]. Since the sys-
tem is reduced as the univariate model of (5), the derivation of determinacy condition
is easy. In the REE, the system of (5) is rewritten as follows:
πt = A +( B + C)Etπt+1 + Drn
t . (37)
Blanchard and Kahn [1980] show the determinacy condition of (37) as |B + C| <
1. This leads to the following proposition.









Thus, the determinacy condition sets the upper bound of φ. This result means
that the central bank should not respond to the expected inﬂation rate very strongly,
because such a strong response causes the emergence of sunspot equilibria. This is
the issue raised by Bernanke and Woodford [1997].
4.2 Relationship between Determinacy and E-stability
Next, we examine the relationship between the determinacy condition and the E-
stability condition. Speciﬁcally, we investigate a situation in which all private agents
engage in adaptive learning by referring to the central bank’s forecast.18 In this case,
the E-stability condition is given by Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. By combining
these with Proposition 3, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the central bank engages in MSV learning and all pri-
vate agents engage in adaptive learning by referring to the central bank’s forecast.
Then, the following statements hold.
(i) If 1 > β +κσ, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the REE of (5) to be








(ii) If 3 ≥ β + κσ ≥ 1, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the REE of (5)








18The extension to the situation in which some private agents engage in adaptive learning by
referring to the central bank’s forecast is straightforward.
12(iii) If β + κσ > 3, the REE of (5) cannot be both E-stable and determinate for
any value of φ.
The condition (39) is the same as the determinacy condition (38). This means
that, in the case (i), the determinacy condition is a suﬃcient condition for the E-
stability of the REE. However, this is a relatively special case, because β + κσ is
usually more than unity (since β is close to unity).
Therefore, for a wide range of the parameter sets, determinacy is not a suﬃcient
condition for the E-stability of the REE. This is an important ﬁnding in the litera-
ture, because McCallum [2007] points out that, if the current-period information is
available in the process of adaptive learning, determinacy becomes a suﬃcient con-
dition for the E-stability of the REE, in a broad class of linear models. In contrast
to the argument of McCallum [2007], Proposition 4 indicates that the determinacy is
not necessarily a suﬃcient condition for the E-stability, even though both the central
bank and private agents calculate the expectations (ECB
t πt+1 and EP
t πt+1)b yu s i n g
the information at period t. This result suggests that, in the presence of the leader-
follower relationship in adaptive learning, the determinacy does not automatically
guarantee the E-stability of the REE.
Since β + κσ is usually greater than unity, the cases of (ii) and (iii) deserve our
a t t e n t i o n . I nt h ec a s e( i i ) ,t h er e g i o no fE - s t a b l ea n dd e t e r m i n a t eR E Ei sn a r r o w .
This means that the central bank’s choice of the value φ is highly restrictive. The
environment of the case (iii) is even more severe, because the central bank cannot
simultaneously satisfy the conditions of determinacy and E-stability. In the case (iii),
we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the central bank engages in MSV learning and all pri-
vate agents engage in adaptive learning by referring to the central bank’s forecast.
Then, under the condition of β + κσ ≥ 3, the following statements hold.
























Thus, if β+κσ > 3, the central bank must choose either determinacy or E-stability.
If the monetary policy rule satisﬁes (41), then the E-stable sunspot equilibria emerge.
13This is the situation investigated by Honkapohja and Mitra [2004]. In this case, the
central bank’s strong reaction to the expected inﬂation rate guarantees the E-stability.
However, the endogenous ﬂuctuations can occur, because multiple REE satisfy the
E-stability. Honkapohja and Mitra [2004] recommend that the monetary policy rule
should rule out this possibility. However, if the central bank avoids the emergence of
E-stable sunspot equilibria, the REE must be E-unstable. In this sense, the central
bank faces a serious trade-oﬀ.
In sum, the results indicate that, if private agents engage in adaptive learning by
referring to the central bank’s forecast, the central bank’s policymaking must be more
restrictive than in the benchmark case in which both the central bank and private
agents independently engage in adaptive learning. This means that, if the central
bank is the leader of expectation formation, a forward-looking monetary policy rule
has more serious problems than those pointed out in Bernanke and Woodford [1997].
4.3 A Remedy
As in the previous subsection, we ﬁnd that a forward-looking policy rule has serious
problems when private agents engage in adaptive learning by referring to the central
bank’s forecast. A possible remedy for this problem is that the central bank addi-
tionally introduces the contemporaneous data of the inﬂation rate into a policy rule.
Suppose that the central bank introduces the following monetary policy rule:
rt = φECB
t πt+1 + γπt, (44)
where γ is the responsiveness to the contemporaneous data of the inﬂation rate.
Then, the reduced model has the same form of (5). However, the coeﬃcients are




1+κσγ, and D = κσ
1+κσγ.
As in Section 4.1, the determinacy condition is obtained as |B + C| < 1.T h i s
leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The economy of (1), (2), (3), and (44) has a unique REE if and








Thus, the central bank can relax the determinacy condition by increasing the value
of γ. This is a natural consequence because previous studies (including Bullard and
Mitra [2002]) have shown that the rule with contemporaneous data is more robust for
determinacy than the rule with forward-looking expectations. By responding to the
contemporaneous data of the inﬂation rate, the central bank can reduce the sensitivity
of the economic system to forward-looking expectations. This is why determinacy is
more easily satisﬁed under rule (44) than (4).
14Next, we examine the E-stability condition under rule (44). Suppose that all
private agents engage in adaptive learning by referring to the central bank’s forecast.
Then, we can derive the E-stability condition, following the same steps in Section 3.
The result is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the central bank engages in MSV learning and all pri-
vate agents engage in adaptive learning by referring to the central bank’s forecast.
Then, the REE of (1), (2), (3), and (44) is E-stable if and only if (46) and (47)
hold.








Thus, the E-stability condition is relaxed by introducing the coeﬃcient γ.B y
increasing the value of γ, the central bank can easily attain the E-stability of the
REE. The reason for this result is explained by the fact that, in the NKPC (3), the
contemporaneous inﬂation rate is determined by private agents’ expected inﬂation
rate. Because of this property, the central bank can respond to the forecast errors of
private agents, by responding to the contemporaneous data of the inﬂation rate.
Therefore, the central bank can simultaneously relax the conditions of determi-
nacy and E-stability, by responding to the contemporaneous movements of the inﬂa-
tion rate. This result suggests that it is dangerous for the central bank to introduce
a purely forward-looking monetary policy rule. A more robust policy strategy is to
respond to the contemporaneous movements of the inﬂation rate to a certain degree.
5 E-stability in the Reverse Situation
In this study, we have examined the situation in which private agents engage in adap-
tive learning by referring to the central bank’s forecast. Readers may be interested
in the E-stability condition in the reverse situation in which the central bank engages
in adaptive learning by referring to the forecast of private agents.
The derivation of the E-stability condition is just the same as in Section 3. Fol-
lowing similar steps, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Suppose that all private agents engage in MSV learning and the cen-
tral bank engages in adaptive learning by referring to the aggregate forecast of private
agents. Then, the REE of (5) is E-stable if and only if (15) holds.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Therefore, in this reverse situation, the E-stability condition corresponds to the
Taylor principle. Intuitively, this result can be interpreted as follows. In this situ-
ation, the central bank’s forecast errors exceed the forecast errors of private agents
15(following the exactly opposite logic of Section 3.4). Therefore, in order to oﬀset
private agents’ forecast errors, the central bank’s reaction to its own forecast need
not to be as large as the Taylor principle suggests (i.e. φ can be smaller than unity).
However, to oﬀset the central bank’s own forecast errors, the Taylor principle is still
required. This is why the E-stability condition is given by the Taylor principle.
Therefore, if private agents are the leaders and the central bank is the follower, the
E-stability condition is just the same as in the benchmark case, which is investigated
in Section 2. In this environment, the central bank can guarantee both the E-stability
and determinacy of the REE by satisfying the Taylor principle. This implies that the
central bank can more easily ensure macroeconomic stability in a case in which the
central bank is the follower, rather than the leader of expectation formation.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this study, we have examined the E-stability of the REE in a simple New Key-
nesian model in which private agents engage in adaptive learning by referring to the
central bank’s forecast. In contrast to a situation in which both the central bank and
private agents independently (or simultaneously) engage in adaptive learning (such as
the case of Bullard and Mitra [2002]), the E-stability is not attained solely by the so-
called Taylor principle. To ensure the convergence to the REE, the central bank must
respond more strongly to the expected inﬂation rate than the Taylor principle sug-
gests. On the other hand, the central bank’s strong reaction to the expected inﬂation
rate raises the possibility of indeterminacy of the REE, as pointed out in Bernanke
and Woodford [1997]. In considering these problems, a robust policy strategy is to
respond to the contemporaneous data of the inﬂation rate to a certain degree.
16Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
The local asymptotic stability ofe b and e d is satisﬁed if and only if all the eigenvalues









ρ(B + C) − 1 ρB(1 − ρ(B + C))−1D
−(1 − ρ(B + C))2D−1 ρB − 1
!
. (A1)
The characteristic polynomial of (A1) is given as follows:
λ2 +( 2− 2ρB − ρC)λ +1− ρB − ρC =0 . (A2)
All the eigenvalues of (A1) have negative real parts if and only if (2−2ρB−ρC) > 0










Next, we examine the local asymptotic stability of e a and e c. The Jacobian of (30)








B + C − 1 B
B + C − 1 B − 1
!
. (A5)
The characteristic polynomial of (A5) is as follows:
λ2 +( 2− 2B − C)λ +1− B − C =0 . (A6)
Therefore, the local asymptotic stability of (A5) at REE is satisﬁe di fa n do n l yi f









Note that, since 1 > ρ > 0, (A3) holds if (A7) holds. Similarly, (A4) holds if (A8)
holds. Therefore, the E-stability condition corresponds to (A7) and (A8).
17Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
If the central bank and a proportion 1−μ of private agents engage in MSV learning
and a proportion μ of private agents engage in adaptive learning by referring to the
central bank’s forecast, the relevant characteristic polynomials are given as follows:
λ2 +( 2− 2ρ b B − ρb C)λ +1− ρ b B − ρb C =0 , (B1)
λ2 +( 2− 2 b B − b C)λ +1− b B − b C =0 . (B2)
Then, the E-stability condition corresponds to that in which all of 2−ρ b B −2ρb C,
1 − ρ b B − ρb C, 2 − b B − 2b C,a n d1 − b B − b C are strictly positive. These are equivalent
to the following conditions:
φ > 1+μ +







φ > 1+μ +







Since 1 > ρ > 0, (B3) holds if (B5) holds. Similarly, (B4) holds if (B6) holds.
Therefore, the E-stability condition corresponds to (B5) and (B6).
18A p p e n d i xC :P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8
If all private agents engage in MSV learning and the central bank engages in
adaptive learning by referring to the aggregate forecast of private agents, the relevant
characteristic polynomials are given as follows:
λ2 +( 2− ρB − 2ρC)λ +1− ρB − ρC =0 , (C1)
λ2 +( 2− B − 2C)λ +1− B − C =0 . (C2)
Then, the E-stability condition corresponds to that in which all of 2 − ρB − 2ρC,
1 − ρB − ρC, 2 − B − 2C,a n d1 − B − C are strictly positive. These are equivalent























Since 1 > ρ > 0, (C3) holds if (C5) holds. Similarly, (C4) holds if (C6) holds.
Furthermore, (C5) holds if (C6) holds. Therefore, the E-stability condition is given
by (C6).
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